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Recent Decisions
LIENS AND SECURITY INTERESTS - CONSTRUCTION AND
OPERATION - PRIORITY BETWEEN CHATTEL MORTGAGE
AND REPAIRMAN'S LIEN - NEW STATEMENT OF OHIO LAW
Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Berry, 2 Ohio St. 2d 169, 207
N.E.2d 545 (1965)
At common law, one to whom an automobile is delivered for
repairs and who makes the desired repairs has a lien on the vehicle
for the labor and materials furnished and not paid for, so long as
he retains possession of the automobile.' The Ohio Supreme Court
was recently called upon to settle a conflict as to the priorities be-
tween such a lien and a chattel mortgage in Commonwealth Loan
Co. v. Berry.2 In that case, the plaintiff held a chattel mortgage on
a motor vehicle owned by the defendant. The co-defendant, an
automobile repair company, had repaired the mortgaged vehicle at
the request of the owner, subsequent to the chattel mortgage. The
defendant failed to pay the repair bill and the repair company re-
tained possession, claiming a common law lien. Thereafter, when
the defendant also defaulted on the mortgage payment, the plaintiff
brought an action to replevy the vehicle, claiming that the chattel
mortgage was superior to the repairman's lien.
Until the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Ohio
in 1962,' it was settled law that a chattel mortgage, duly noted on
the face of a certificate of tide, was superior to claims of the "credi-
tors of the debtor and other lienholders or claimants."'4  How-
ever, with the adoption of section 9-310 of the Uniform Commer-
cial- Code,' repairmans' liens were made superior to chattel mort-
gages, provided they were not specifically subordinated by other
legislation. Hence, the question in the instant case was whether this
provision of the code affected prior decisions giving priority to the
chattel mortgage. Basing its opinion on statutory interpretation,
the court held that since section 1309.29 of the Ohio Revised Code
1. 7A BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5092
(1950); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 107 (2d ed. 1955); 2 KENT'S COMMEN"
TARIES 635 (13th ed. 1884).
2. 2 Ohio St. 2d 169, 207 N.E.2d 545 (1965); Snyder v. Ryan, 2 Ohio St. 2d 171,
207 N.E.2d 547 (1965) (companion case.)
3. OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1301.01-1309.50 [hereinafter cited as CODE 5].
4. CODE § 4505.13.
5. CODE § 1309.29.
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(U.C.C. § 9-310) is of general applicability whereas the certificate
of title law is of special applicability, the latter must prevail since
under accepted rules of statutory interpretation statutes of special
application control over statutes of general application. 6  There-
fore, it is now the law in Ohio that the provisions of the certificate
of title law control over the provisions of section 1309.29 relating
to priority of liens arising by operation of law.
The precise origin of the repairman's lien is in doubt, although
some authorities believe the lien was first given to afford relief to
repairmen and skilled craftsmen before development of the writ of
assumpsit. It provided relief for a repairman who had rendered
services without first having expressly contracted to do the work.
Even with the subsequent establishment of the theories of implied
contract, the recognition of such liens continued to grow until now
it has become firmly entrenched as an important part of modern se-
curity law.7
The two conflicting policy considerations involved in determin-
ing priority as between a chattel mortgagee and a repairman are:
(1) claims first in time should be first in right; and (2) preference
should be given to tradesmen who must hold themselves out to the
public and who have little opportunity to determine the financial
responsibility of their customers.' In an attempt to resolve this
conflict, the courts have generally recognized that liens first in time
are first in right; however, a caveat is then added that a mortgagee
may subordinate his claim to the claims of others, either expressly
or by his conduct. Relating this to a situation where the mortgaged
property has been repaired subsequent to the mortgage, some courts
have held that the mortgagee impliedly consented to the mortgagor's
contract for repairs, thereby subordinating his claim to the claim of
the repairman.' The courts have also used such theories as agency,
waiver, and estoppel to accomplish the same goal.' ° While the ap-
plication of such theories has been confusingly inconsistent, the re-
sult reached is that the mortgagee is estopped from asserting his
priority.
6. Andrianos v. Community Traction Co., 155 Ohio St. 47, 97 N.E.2d 549 (1951).
7. See Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L REV. 53, 61 (1888).
8. Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 229, 231 (1954).
9. Lee, Power of Possessor of Personal Property to Create Lien for Repairs and Storage
Charges Superior to Existing Interests of Others, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 910, 912 (1942);
Note, 15 IND. L.J. 573 (1940).
10. Annot., 36 A.LR.2d 229, 231 n.5 (1954).
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The landmark case in this area is Williams v. Allsup." Here,
a shipwright performed services on a ship encumbered by a chattel
mortgage. In resolving the issue of priorities in favor of the re-
pairman, the court held that by leaving the mortgagor in possession
of the ship, the mortgagee had clothed the mortgagor with apparent
ownership. Hence, the mortgagee was held to have impliedly con-
sented to the creation of the repair lien making the resulting lien
superior to his claim. In a concurring opinion, Judge Byles stated:
Now, as it is obvious that every ship will from time to time re-
quire repairs, it seems but reasonable under circumstances like
these to infer that the mortgagor had authority from the mortgagees
to cause such repairs as should become necessary to be done
upon the usual and ordinary terms. Now, what are the usual and
ordinary terms? Why, that the person by whom the repairs are
ordered should alone be liable personally, but that the shipwright
should have a lien upon the ship for the work and labour he has
expended on her. Nor are the mortgagees at all prejudicially af-
fected thereby. They have a property augmented in value by the
amount of the repairs.' 2
The law in this country is in much conflict on this subject, the
courts holding either for the chattel mortgagee by rejecting or dis-
tinguishing the Williams decision, or for the repairman by finding
some way to overcome the "first in time, first in right" doctrine. To
bring order to inconsistent judical decisions, many state legislatures
have arbitrarily established priorities by statute. 3 The Ohio legis-
lature passed a bailee's lien statute; however, liens on motor vehicles
were expressly excluded from its operation. 4 Therefore, the first
case to come before the Ohio Supreme Court was resolved in favor
of the chattel mortgagee on common law principles.'" The court
distinguished Williams v. Allsup, holding that since the vehicle in
question was used for pleasure and in no way affected the mort-
gagor's business and ability to repay the debt, the mortgagee could
not be deemed to have implied consent for the repairs. However,
the repairman argued that since the mortgage expressly provided
that the vehicle was to be kept in good repair, the mortgagee had
thereby expressly consented to the repairs. The court rejected
11. 10 C.B. (N.S.) 417, 142 Eng. Rep. 514 (C.P. 1861).
12. Id. at 422, 142 Eng. Rep. at 518.
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-404 (1963); CAL. VEICLE CODE § 6301; KAN. GEN
STAT. ANN. § 58-201 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. LIEN LAW § 184; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-2
(Supp. 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-13-04 (1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 289.41
(1958) (priority is given for lien up to $200 on automobiles).
14. CODE § 1333.41.
15. Metropolitan Sec. Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St. 583, 140 N.E. 306 (1923).
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
this contention by stating that upon no reasonable theory could
this clause in the mortgage be held to constitute consent for
the repairs. In so holding, the court found that the "under-
lying principle . . . is that the lien which is prior in time is
prior in right, and that the record of the mortgage is notice to the
whole world, including the repair man."16  However, the dissenting
judge was of the opinion that the "obligation imposed by the mort-
gagee upon the mortgagor carries with it the law applicable to such
contract, to-wit, the law giving to any repairer, rebuilder or me-
chanic the right to the fair and reasonable value of his work and
material in doing such repairing or rebuilding."' 7  The dissent then
went on to question the logic of the majority opinion which held
that while destruction of the chattel would ordinarily destroy the
lien, the lien is resurrected to its original high standing by the ef-
forts and at the expense of the laborer who may not even be able
to recover the fair value of his services. The dissenting judge would
therefore have applied the equitable principle that when one of two
innocent parties must suffer a loss, the one that creates the conditions
ought to be made to bear it. In other words, since the chattel mort-
gagee had permitted the mortgagor to retain possession not only
authorizing but imposing upon such mortgagor the duty of keeping
the vehicle in repair, the claim of the mortgagee ought to be sub-
ordinated.
It may be laid down as a legal truism that, when claims are equal
in law and equity, in reason and good conscience, those prior in
time are prior in right. Necessarily, however, this applies only to
claims of the same class, the same nature, essentially alike or an-
alogous in origin and kind. But upon what principle can it be
claimed, as to the claims of the money lender, who makes his loan
at his own risk, basing his interest and commission charges, etc.,
upon his estimate of the hazard involved, permitting the chattel
upon which he holds his lien to be possessed and used by others
upon the much-traveled highways of the state, where there is con-
stant danger of collision, that such a lien, under such circumstances,
is of the same class as the mechanic's or workman's, who in
the ordinary course of business is called upon to rebuild and repair
such automobile when wrecked and entirely unfit and incapable
of use?
18
The holding in the Metropolitan" case was followed in Cleve-
16. Id. at 594, 140 N.E. at 309.
17. Id. at 601-02, 140 N.E. at 311.
18. Id. at 610-11, 140 N.E. at 314.
19. 107 Ohio St. 583, 140 N.E. 306 (1923).
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land Auto Top & Trimming Co. v. American Fin. Co. 21 In the latter
case, the court held that the "mortgagor could not contract a debt
giving rise to a lien upon the mortgagee's property without the mort-
gagee's authority."2' And in this case, no authority, express or im-
plied, could be found. The holdings in Metropolitan and Cleveland
Auto Top & Trimming Co. formed the foundation for all subsequent
decisions in Ohio on the point. Furthermore, the adoption of the
Ohio Certificate of Tide Act 2 in 1938 afforded even greater support
for this position by giving the chattel mortgagee what many con-
sidered to be an unassailable priority over the claims of repairmen
and other lienholders.
In light of the foregoing principles, the Berry case must be
examined in terms of the two basic questions presented: (1) what
is the effect of the conflict between section 1309.29 of the Ohio
Revised Code which makes repairman's liens superior to chattel
mortgages and the decisions in Ohio adopting the "first in time, first
in right" theory; and (2) what policy considerations come to bear
upon any resolution of this conflict. First, it must be noted that
section 1309.29 provides that if a repairman's lien is recognized,
either by statute or by rule of law, then the lien is to be given pri-
ority over other security interests, unless it is statutory and that stat-
ute provides otherwise. Since repairman's liens have always been
recognized in Ohio by judicial decision, section 1309.29 would give
it priority over chattel mortgages. To resolve the conflict between
this provision and the provisions in the Ohio Certificate of Title Act
giving priority to the chattel mortgagee, the court in the Berry de-
cision applied the principle of statutory construction known as
specialia generalibus derogant - special language controls over
general. 3  From this the court concluded that the chattel mortgage
had priority. At first blush, this conclusion seems correct; however,
further consideration raises some doubt. Since the Certificate of
Title Act controls as to all interests in a motor vehicle, while section
20. 124 Ohio St. 169, 177 N.E. 217 (1931).
21. Id. at 172, 177 N.E. at 218.
22. CODi ch. 4505. CODE § 4505.13 provides, inter alia: "Any security agreement
covering a security interest in a motor vehicle.., if a notation of such instrument has
been made by the clerk of the court of common pleas on the face of such certificate [of
title), shall be valid as against the creditors of the debtor, whether armed with process
or not, and against subsequent purchasers, secured parties, and other lienholders or
claimants."
23. Kintore v. Inverury, II Scot. App. 1179, 4 Macq. App. 520 (1863); See 2
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCtiON § 5204 (3d. ed. 1943) and cases cited
therein.
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1309.29 deals only with repairman's liens, it would seem reason-
able to conclude that the latter provision is in reality the special
provision. Furthermore, it is important to note that rules of
statutory construction are to be used only when the legislature's in-
tent is unclear or otherwise unavailable.24 Here, however, the legis-
lature's intent is apparent. In considering the Uniform Commercial
Code, the legislature had before it two reports interpreting the
code's provisions: the official comments explaining the purpose and
scope of each section of the code; and the Legislative Service Com-
mission Report dealing with the effect the code would have on ex-
isting Ohio law.25 The official comments following the repairman's
lien section dearly indicate that the purpose of the sections is "to
provide that liens securing claims arising from work intended to
enhance or preserve the value of a chattel take priority over earlier
security interests even though perfected."2 The Legislative Service
Commission Report determined that adoption of section 9-310
would "reverse the usual rule as to chattel mortgages, that fil-
ing constitutes notice to all, including repairmen. 27 The report
then indicated that the Metropolitan" case and the Cleveland Auto
Top & Trimming Co.29 case would be reversed. Thus, it seems
clear that since the legislature was cognizant of the change that
would be brought about in this area by adoption of the code and
did nothing to limit its effect that it thereby intended to reverse the
existing decisions by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code.
Aside from the question of statutory interpretation, the wisdom
of the court's policy decision in the Berry case is questionable. The
underlying policy of the Uniform Commercial Code is that legal
concepts ought to be brought into line with modern commercial
practices, thereby giving uniformity to business practices through-
out the nation."0 If this was also the paramount intention of the
Ohio legislature, it would follow that only by giving full effect to
each of the Code's provisions could this goal be realized. In con-
24. 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 23, § 5204.
25. Ohio Legislative Service Comm., Ohio Annotations to Uniform Commercial Code,
INFORMATION BULL. No. 1958-1 (1958). The sections of the report are printed
verbatim following the appropriate sections of the Uniform Commercial Code in the
Ohio Revised Code (Baldwin).
26. U.C.C. § 9-310 (comment 1).
27. Ohio Legislative Service Comm., op. cit. supra note 25, at IX-12, -13.
28. Metropolitan Sec. Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St. 583, 140 N.E. 306 (1923).
29. Cleveland Auto Top & Trimming Co. v. American Fin. Co., 124 Ohio St. 169,
177 N.E. 217 (1931).
30. U.C.C. § 1-102; CoDE § 1301.02.
1000 [VoL 16:995
Repairman's Lien
sidering the priorities established by section 9-310, a Kentucky
Court of Appeals took occasion to extol the virtues of the code in
this respect:
The Code represents an entirely new approach in several areas of
commercial law, and especially as to security transactions. Its
adoption in this state signifies a legislative policy to join with
other states in achieving uniformity. ... The realization of this
purpose demands that so far as possible the meaning of the law
be gathered from the instrument itself, unfeathered by anach-
ronisms indigenous to the respective jurisdictions in which it
is enforced. 31
While the motor vehicle registration act of Kentucky"2 does not
have the same force and sanctity as the Ohio act, the logic and ap-
peal of this decision ought to represent the attitudes of other states
that have adopted the Code.
Thus far it has been assumed that the court in Berry was correct
in applying the certificate of title act to the facts in that case. How-
ever, upon closer analysis it would appear that application and in-
terpretation of that statute were not required to dispose of the case.
The paramount consideration in Berry was whether the mortgagee
had subordinated his claim to that of the repairman by his conduct
with respect to the mortgaged vehicle. In this regard, it may be
noted that a mortgagee may always subordinate his claim either by
express or implied acts. 3 Likewise, a mortgagee will be estopped
from claiming his priority if a third person justifiably relies on his
conduct. 4 Thus, if a mortgagee allows a mortgagor to retain pos-
ession and use the mortgaged vehicle knowing fMll-well that in the
ordinary course of events repairs will likely be needed, then he should
be deemed to have impliedly given the mortgagor consent to con-
tract for such repairs. If a lien is thereby created by operation of
law, then the mortgagee's interest ought to be subordinated to the
31. Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); see
also 82 BANKING I.J. 408 (1965); Note, 14 CAriiOuc U.L. R1v. 285 (1965).
32. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 186.005-.640 (1963).
33. Williams v. Ailsup, 10 C.B. (N.S.) 417, 142 Eng. Rep. 514 (C.P. 1861); Ohio Fin.
Co. v. Middleton, 14 Ohio App. 43 (1921); 7A BLASHFIELD, CYcLOPEDiA oF AuTo-
MOBILE LAW AND PRACcIcE § 5163 (1950); BROWN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 112; Lee,
supra note 9, at 912.
34. See Cherry's Inc. v. Sharpensteen, 33 Ariz. 342, 265 Pac. 90 (1928); New
Britain Real Estate & Tide Co. v. Collington, 102 Conn. 652, 129 Ad. 780 (1925);
Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. Linsky, 99 Ind. App. 691, 192 N.E. 715 (1934);
Etchen v. Dennis & Son Garage, 104 Kan. 241, 178 Pac. 408 (1919); Meyers v.-
Neeley & Ensor Auto. Co., 143 Md. 107, 121 Ad. 916 (1923); Guaranty Sec. Corp.
v. Brophy, 243 Mass. 597, 137 N.E. 751 (1923); Terminal & Town Taxi Corp. v.
O'Rourke, 117 Misc. 761, 193 N.Y.S. 238 (New York City Ct. 1922).
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lien of the repairman.35 Other courts have resolved this problem
by applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In such cases, the
statutory priority of a chattel mortgage is subordinated by determin-
ing that the repairman is the most innocent of the two lienholders.
The principle is that where one of two innocent parties must suffer
a loss for the wrongs of a third party, the party that trusted the
wrongdoer first and placed in his hands the means by which he
committed the wrong must suffer the loss.36 Thus, in the Berry
case, the mortgagee provided the mortgagor with possession and
clothed him with apparent ownership. As between these two equal-
ly innocent lienholders, the chattel mortgagee should be made to
bear the loss."
The Ohio courts have recognized both of these methods of sub-
ordinating the interest of a chattel mortgagee, notwithstanding the
fact that the mortgagee's interest was clearly indorsed on the cert-
ficate of title. For example, where a mortgagee allows the mort-
gagor to exhibit encumbered motor vehicles for sale, and the mort-
gagor thereafter breaches the mortgage agreement by selling the
vehicles to innocent purchasers, the courts have held that the
innocent purchasers have good title and that the mortgagee is es-
topped from claiming any interest, notwithstanding the fact that his
claim was duly noted on the certificate of title and the purchasers
were deemed to be cognizant of such claims.38 Thus, it would seem
35. See, e.g., Guaranty Sec. Corp. v. Brophy, 243 Mass. 597, 137 N.E. 751 (1923);
Hammond v. Danielson, 126 Mass. 294 (1879); Terminal & Town Taxi Corp. v.
O'Rourke, 117 Misc. 761, 193 N.Y.S. 238 (New York City Ct. 1922); Ohio Fin.
Co. v. Middleton, 14 Ohio App. 43 (1921); Bankers Commercial Sec. Co. v. Coff-
man, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 193 (C.P. 1919); Stern v. Sica, 66 Pa. Super. 84 (1917);
Jesse A. Smith Auto Co. v. Kaestner, 164 Wis. 205, 159 N.W. 738 (1916).
36. Metropolitan Sec. Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St. 583, 610, 140 N.E. 306, 314
(1923) (dissenting opinion).
37. Some courts have granted relief to the repairman on the principle that when a
chattel encumbered by a lien is destroyed, the lien is destroyed as well, or at least re-
duced to the value of what remains of the chattel. New Britain Real Estate & Title Co.
v. Collington, 102 Conn. 652, 129 Atl. 780 (1925); Etchen v. Dennis & Son Garage,
104 Kan. 241, 178 Pac. 408 (1919); Terminal & Town Taxi Corp. v. O'Rourke, 117
Misc. 761, 193 N.Y.S. 238 (New York City Ct. 1922). See also Metropolitan
Sec. Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St. 583, 595, 140 N.E. 306, 310 (1923) (dissenting
opinion.): The rationale is that the mortgagee is unjustly enriched at the expense of
the repairman if allowed to retain priority after his interest has been substantially
impaired and then reinstated by the efforts of a repairman. To allow the chattel
mortgagee to have his interest enhanced at the expense of the repairman would be a
windfall to the mortgagee, and he should be precluded from claiming priority. Since
the common law lien is only to the extent of the value added to the chattel, the mort-
gagee is not prejudiced by subordination. BROWN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 108. He
will have a lien on the vehicle to the extent of its value prior to the repairs.
38. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union, 110 Ohio App. 341, 165 N.E.2d
435 (1960) (estoppel); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Kozoil, 111 Ohio App. 501, 165 N.E.2d
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that if a chattel mortgagee is estopped from asserting his priority un-
der the certificate of tide laws in such a case, he should likewise be
estopped where an innocent repairman has undertaken to repair the
mortgaged vehicle and the mortgagor has defaulted on payment."
In contradiction to this approach, it has been argued that a repair-
man is bound by constructive notice of the information on the certifi-
cate of tide.4" But since the courts do not impose any duty upon
purchasers to inspect the title when buying a new car, it cannot be
reasonably expected that repairmen will do it before undertaking
to make any necessary repairs.
In conclusion, it is appropriate to emphasize that the granting
of priority to a repairman, whether accomplished by statute or rule
of law, is basically an equitable allocation of loss between two inno-
cent parties. It would be inequitable to permit a mortgagee to re-
tain superiority after the encumbered chattel had depreciated and
then been restored through the expense and labor of a repairman.
To so hold would be to give the mortgagee a windfall at the ex-
pense of the repairman. Furthermore, it would seem that due con-
sideration ought to be given to the fact that a financial institution
is in the business of taking capital risks and therefore scale their in-
terest rates accordingly. The repairman usually operates a small
establishment and has no effective means of adjusting his service
charges to cover such losses. It is by recognition of this fact that
the courts can give effective relief.
LARRY S. TURNER'
444 (1960), afI'd, 172 Ohio St. 265, 175 N.E.2d 88 (1961) (implied authority); 22
OHIO ST. I-J. 746 (1961). For a discussion of the effect of these cases on the Ohio
Certificate of Title Law, see Note, The Near-Absolute Rights of the Holder of an Ohic
Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title, 15 W. RES. L. REV. 785, 794 (1964).
39. In affirming Mutual Fin. Co. v. Kozoil, supra note 38, the Ohio-Supreme Court
held that the provisions of the certificate of tide law were not applicable to the factual
situation and that the principles of equity should be applied. The wisdom and logic
used in this case could have been equally applied in the Berry case. At issue is really
whether the mortgagee, by his conduct, has subordinated his claim to that of the re-
pairman. This is the identical issue considered in Metropolitan Sec. Co. v. Orlow,
107 Ohio St. 583, 140 NE. 306 (1923). While the court in Berry decided the same
as it did in Metropolitan, by clear and careful reconsideration of all'policies and equities
involved an opposite decision should have been reached
40. Lazerick v. Associate Inv. Co., 30 Ohio L. Abs. 112 (Ct. App. 1939).
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